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PRORATA CORPORATE RECOVERIES
PRORATA RECOVERY BY SHAREHOLDERS ON
CORPORATE CAUSES OF ACTION AS A
MEANS OF ACHIEVING CORPORATE JUSTICE
By EDWARD J. GRENIER, JR.*-
Ordinarily the entire recovery in a shareholder derivative suit goes
to the corporation. On occasion, however, in order to straighten out
the affairs of some closely held corporations, courts have decreed direct
recovery to sharehdlders in proportion to the number of shares held
by each. In 1955, in the landmark case of Perlman v. Feldmann,'
direct prorata recovery was decreed for the first time in a case in-
volving a publicly held corporation. This significant extension of the
prorata remedy opens the way to its use as a practical alternative to
a corporate recovery in a great variety of derivative suits. It also, how-
ever, is likely to raise a host of problems not previously faced by the
courts in dealing with closely held corporations. This article will
examine some of the problems and implications, largely unexplored
in Perlman, arising out of the extension of this remedy to publicly
held corporations. Chief among the problems seems to be working
out procedural rules which will assure reasonable protection to the
potentially conflicting interests of the several groups that make up the
large modern corporation. Some of the major implications arising
from the Pernman decision might relate to the very nature of the
corporation and the derivative suit.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRORATA RECOVERY
Originally, in the United States the shareholder's suit, although on
behalf of his corporation, was not based upon a strict concept of the
corporate entity.2 The plaintiff brought the action as representative
of all the shareholders, except any that might be defendants, even
*Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
tThe author wishes to express his thanks to Professor David R. Herwitz of
the Harvard Law School, who first led him to a consideration of this subject.
1219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1274,
on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (1958), 16o F.
Supp. 3io (D. Conn. 1958) (final order). This case is extensively discussed in Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 7o Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957).
2See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 98o, 989 (1957).
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though the recovery inured to the corporation. When such actions
were brought against parties outside the corpor r, ton, courts began
stressing t.. fact that the cause of action belonged to the corporation
as a separate entity, and that the plaintiff was suing primarily as rep-
resentative of this entity.3 In this way the derivative suit came to be
rationalized on a theory of strict separation of the corporation from
its shareholders. 4 However, in order to prevent abuse, the equity courts
imposed certain requirements as to standing that had to be met to
entitle a shareholder to bring suit.5 Even with these procedural safe-
guards designed to prevents abuses, in certain situations a corporate re-
covery led to either inconvenience or injustice. Therefore, some courts
abandoning rigid formalism, granted recovery directly to the plain-
tiff-shareholders and other shareholders found entitled to damages
in proportion to the number of shares held by each.
A. Distinguished From Individual or Class Actions.
A prorata recovery of damages on a corporate cause of action must
be distinguished from recoveries on causes of action owned by share-
holders in their own right, and enforceable in either individual or
class suits.6 A suit by or on behalf of one of several classes of share-
holders is not based on a corporate cause of action, and therefore a
recovery therein is not "prorata" as the term is used herein.7 It may
be difficult, on occasion, though to distinguish between the two types
of suits. Over a strong dissent, one court has held that a suit to com-
pel declaration of a dividend is derivative in nature.8 On the other
hand, a shareholder has been permitted to bring an individual suit,
in his own name, against insiders for misappropriation of corporate
3id. at 990-92.
4See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1089, 1091, 1095 (5 th ed. i941).5For example, the contemporaneous-ownership rule. Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(i),
Hawes v. Oakland, 1o4 US. 450 (1882).
'See, e.g., Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 784, 796 (2d ed. 1949). But
see Comment, 46 ill. L. Rev. 937 (1952) (advocates nonderivative shareholders'
action for diminution in the value of their shares, reserving to the corporation
an action for the loss of assets). This recommendation, however, seems to ignore
the possibility of the shareholders benefiting twice. Compare General Rubber Co.
v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, io9 N.E. 96 (1915).
7See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). When used
alone, "pro rata" hereinafter means prorata recovery.
8Gordon v. Elliman, 3o6 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E. 331 (1954) (4-3 decision); cf.
Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270
App. Div. 925, 62 N.Y.S.2d 760, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d 88 (1946)
(derivative suit with prorata recovery).
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assets-the classical derivative-suit situation.9 Even if prorata recovery
would be appropriate in this latter situation, the nature of the suit
may be crucial if the plaintiff is unable to meet the procedural pre-
requisites for bringing a derivative suit.10 Generally, however, courts
have maintained the distinction between recovery by the shareholder
in his own right and recovery in a derivative suit of his prorata share of
damages payable to the corporation.11
B. Typical Situations in Which Prorata Recovery Has Been Decreed.
Prorata recovery on a corporate cause of action has been decreed:
(i) to provide a cbnvenient method for ultimate distribution when
the corporation is in liquidation or when its assets have been sold;
(2) to protect shareholders from dissipation of a corporate recovery
because of foreseeable future mismanagement by the defendants, who
will remain in control of corporate affairs; (3) to limit recovery to
"innocent" shareholders; and (4) to provide a remedy against those
who sell corporate control for an excessive consideration.
12
The liquidation situation presents no difficulties of theory or
policy. In the other situations, however, the corporation is a going
concern, and prorata recovery in substance effects a distribution of
some corporate assets to certain shareholders.'
3
9Equitable Trust Co. v. Columbia Nat'l Bank, 145 S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811 (1928)
(action at law based on conversion of plaintiff's shares through taking of corporate
assets). The court appeared influenced in reaching its decision by the fact that all
parties below regarded the suit as properly an action at law; thus the defendants
should not now be permitted to change position. Id. at 133, 142 S.E. at 824.
10E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(1); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b (security-for-
expenses provision applicable to derivative suits).
uSee Dill v. Johnson, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 6o8 (igig); Note, 40 Calif. L.
Rev. 127, 131 n4o (1952). But see Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W
Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920) (some blurring of this distinction).
'-See Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 793-96 (2d ed. 1949); Developments
in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 946
0958) (hereinafter cited Developments-Multiparty Litigation); Note, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 1314 (1956); Note, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1935); 23 Minn. L. Rev. 973, 974
(1939). For the remainder of this article, these situations will be called, respectively
the liquidation situation; the foreseeable-mismanagement situation; the innocent-
shareholder situation; and the sale-of-control situation. These labels may give
more of an appearance of clarity than the cases warrant. There is considerable
overlapping, and they are intended to describe typical situations rather than to
be rigid categorizations. The term "innocent" herein refers to shareholders who
are free not merely from actual participation in the wrongful acts, but also from
acquiesence, laches, etc. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed, as is usual in
derivative suits, that the individual defendants are officers or directors of the cor-
poration.
2'2 The corporate cause of action is in a real sense a corporate asset, even
though it may not be shown on the balance sheet. This asset will cease to exist
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i. Corporation in liquidation.
Prorata recovery simply provides a procedural short cut in the
process of distribution of the corporate assets and is granted by the




When future gross mismanagement on the part of the defendants
can be readily predicted on the basis of past performance,' 5 prorata
recovery should be readily available, provided it is clear that the
plaintiffs will not be adequately protected by a corporate recovery.
Otherwise, a future derivative suit may be required because of an un-
lawful dissipation of of this corporate recovery. Perhaps the only ex-
ception to the granting of pro rata in such cases should be when the
recoverable funds are needed by the corporation to meet current lia-
bilities. It is arguable, of course, that if the record of past mismanage-
ment is so glaring as to require prorata recovery on that basis alone,
the long-term interests of the corporation may be better served by
granting a corporate recovery and appointing a receiver.' 6 Where a
closely held corporation is involved a court-decreed dissolution would
perhaps be the best solution.17
3. Limitation of recovery to "innocent" shareholders.
Situations in which prorata recovery is decreed in order to limit
recovery to ".innocent" shareholders 8 present more difficult ques-
after the suit in which prorata recovery is decreed, and the corporation will not
receive any of the proceeds as a substitute-for this asset. Furthermore, the balance
sheet may show assets which have been misappropriated and are the subject of the
action, thus emphasizing the fact that the cause of action is a corporate asset, a
substitute for the misappropnated assets. Therefore, it is realistic to consider prorata
recovery as an effective distribution of a corporate asset.
"See, e.g., Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939); Alexander v. Quality
Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269 N.Y. Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Fougeray v.
Cord, 5o NJ. Eq. 185, 24 Atl. 499 (Ch. 1892), Tev'd in part sub nom. Laurel
Springs Land Co. v. Fougeray, 5o N.J. Eq. 756, 26 At. 886 (Ct. Err. & App.) (lower
court's decree eliminated plaintiff as a shareholder in the corporation; upper court
gave him right to a reasonable dividend); cf. Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 31
Ad. io58 (i895) (per curiam) (serious prior nsmanagement; prorata recovery
granted in order to obviate necessity of second suit to compel declaration of a
dividend).
:"See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1315 (1956). See generally Baker & Cary,
Cases and Materials on Corporations 7o6-o7 (3 d ed. 1958).
"1See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1511-14 (1958).
"E.g., Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 11o W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (ig3i) (ratifiers
and shareholders with notice of the operations for the directors' benefit barred);
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tions of policy. Unlike the liquidation and foreseeable-mismanage-
ment situations, in which the only basic issue is whether or not a
corporate recovery should be decreed,19 there is the additional com-
plication that the wrongdoers may be permitted to retain funds pro-
portionate to the shares held by persons who, although innocent of
actual wrongdoing, either tacitly acquiesced in or expressly approved
the acts of the defendants. Perhaps when the defendants are directors
guilty of flagrant and wilful breaches of fiduciary duty toward the
corporation, full payment of the corporate damages should be ex-
acted.20 Even though such recovery may include a punitive element,
Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897) (per curiam on opinion below)
(participator in wrong and acquiescer barred); Hams v. Rogers, igo App. Div. 2o8,
179 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1919) (shareholders who gave releases barred; some of plain-
tiff's shares "tainted" and thus barred, but affirmance based upon plaintiff's execu-
tion of judgment). The Illinois court later expressly declined to follow the rule of
the Brown case and granted corporate recovery. Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256,
91 N.E. io56 (igo). In Hams v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 19o N.Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct.
5921), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 2o02 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y. Supp. 942
(i922), the same plaintiff as in the Rogers case was permitted to bring a later
derivative suit against the then present directors, successors to those involved in
the first suit, for failing to sue the former directors.
n'This is not meant to indicate that the problems arising in the innocent-
shareholder situation could not also arise in the two situations discussed above,
if some shareholders were found to have acquiesced in the wrongful acts. However,
the above situations inherently and necessarily raise only the problem of corporate
versus prorata recovery, whereas the innocent-shareholder situation necessarily raises
the issues discussed in the text. Solely for the purpose of analysis, each of the situa-
tions is assumed to exist in its purest form. Thus, in the foreseeable-mismanage-
ment situation, the only shareholders who would be eliminated from sharing in
the recovery are the individual defendants themselves. Of course, these hypothetical
situations will rarely be found in pure form in actual cases.
! "Cf. Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, io4 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 823-26
(1956) who, speaking of sale-of-control cases, suggests a derivative suit with full
corporate recovery is preferable since recovery is "prophylactic" However, the
contention that corporate recovery should be granted because pro rata acts as a
pro tanto ratification of nonratifiable fraud, Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234,
252, 2 A.2d 9o4, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1938), 23 Minn. L. Rev. 937 (1939), Annot., 12o A.L.R.
238 (1939), seems highly formalistic. The acquiescing shareholders are not accepting
the fraud in the name of the corporation, but are merely forfeiting their right to
participate in any recovery.
In these cases, it seems that the breach of fiduciary duty involved is not enough
to show continual past gross mismanagement so as to give a basis for predicting
future mismanagement. Compare McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 1o3 (8th
Cir. 19o6) (corporate recovery; no prolonged history of serious and constant mis-
management). If, however, the breach is flagrant and willful and the defendants'
past conduct over a significant period justifies prorata recovery on the ground of
foreseeable mismanagement, perhaps the defendants should be required to pay all
shareholders other than themselves, including acqusescers or would-be ratifiers, thus
approximating a corporate recovery.
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it could be justified as providing a deterrent against such breaches
of fiduciary duty.
In less serious situations only prorata recovery miy be justifiable
even though the defendants violated a fiduciary Auty. When the lia-
bility of directors arises from negligence, from serious and exten-
sive misjudgments, or from authorization of now completed ultra
vires acts, it may be argued that they should not be required to account
to acquiescing shareholders. In these latter situations it is more likely
that the corporate funds paid out are in the hands of third parties
so that damages payable by the directors would not come from such
funds. Indeed, the directors may have derived no economic benefit at
all from the transactions. 21 Even in some situations in which the di-
rectors obtained corporate funds through a flagrant breach of fiduciary
duty, prorata recovery may be appropriate, because the shareholders'
acquiescence, under the circumstances, is equivalent to a compromise
agreement with the defendants. 22 In such instances, the strong policy
of the law in favor of settlements without litigation seems to swing
the balance in favor of the defendants. Furthermore, the acquiescers
merely receive the results of their bargain when recovery is denied
to them.
4. Sale of control in violation of'a fiduczary duty.
The use of prorata recovery as a means of providing a remedy
against those who sell corporate control for an excessive considera-
tion presents difficulties similar to those of the innocent-shareholder
situation. The primary emphasis in the cases is on holding the pur-
chasers of control to their contract with the defendant sellers and thus
denying any recovery to them. 23 Of course, in addition, there may be
other shareholders against whom the seller-defendants have personal
defences, as in the innocent-shareholder situation. Here, however,
a noncontrolling shareholder should not be found to have acquiesced
in the sale of control unless he had full knowledge of the material
2Ca. Harris v. Pearsall, i16 Misc. 366, i9o N.Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct. i92i),
appeal dismissed on stipulation, 2o2 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y. Supp. 942 (1922).
This factor should not be sufficient to cause a prorata, rather than a corporate,
recovery; however, it should be considered when the defendants' conduct is not
outrageous, even though it involves some sort of breach of fiduciary duty.
'See Chounis v. Laing, 125 W Va. 275, 23 S.E. 628 (1942) (however, no finding
of intent to defraud).
'See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U. S. 952
(1955). But see Leech, supra note 2o, at 823-26.
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facts. Mere failure to object within a reasonable time after the sale
should not be considered acquiescence, since sellers of control fre-
quently attempt to conceal such transactions from the noncontrolling
shareholders. 24 Shareholders with full knowledge, who have failed
to act for a long period, should be barred from recovery, for their
acquiescence must certainly be conscious. In some cases, it may even
be in the nature of a contractual compromise of liability.
Of course, the use of prorata recovery presupposes that a corporate
cause of action exists. Such a cause exists if some corporate "oppor-
tunity" or "asset" has been appropriated by the defendants for their
own benefit.2 5 However, in many cases the only real injury seems to be
to the noncontrolli'ng shareholders, who either were not permitted to
participate in the sale or were induced to sell at a price lower than
that received by the controlling shareholders. In logic, it seems that
in such situations an individual or representative action by such non-
controlling shareholders in their own right should be permitted.
26
Such an action avoids the conceptual difficulty of permitting per-
sons no longer shareholders to receive a portion of damages due to
the corporation.27 The ultimate result of such an individual action
should be the same as that of a derivative suit with prorata recovery,
for in either case an accounting for any excess "premium" will be
required since liability is based upon a breach of fiduciary duty.28
2 'See, e.g., Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76
Atl. 77 (191°) •
'See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955).
2See, e.g. Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 1o7, 179 N.E. 310 (1932). But see
American Trust Co. v. California W States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. ad 42, 66, 98
P.2d 497 (1940) (injury to the corporation). If injury both to the corporation
and to former shareholders is shown, probably both a derivative suit and an
individual action by the former shareholders should be permitted. But care should
be taken not to decree the equivalent of a double recovery against the defendants
(compare note 6, supra), except possibly in the very limited situation described
in note 71, infra, if it is found that the wrong to the corporation injured both a
former and present shareholder.
-1But cf. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956), 35 N.C.L. Rev. 279
(1957) (in nonderivative suit former shareholder in two-man corporation allowed
to recover prorata share of corporate damages).
'Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957) (prorata
recovery), with Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 10 7 , 179 N.E. 31o (1932) (nonderivative
suit). However, the measure of damages might be different if the action is based
upon deceit. See Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 16, at 596. Furthermore, it is
assumed in the text that no damages against the sellers for actual looting by the
purchasers, see Insuransbares v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940), will be recoverable.
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C. Possible Use of Prorata Recovery to Bar "Subsequent" Shareholders
From Sharing in Damages Recoverable by the Co, poration.
Although in many jurisdictions a shareholder does not -have stand-
ing to bring a derivative suit unless he was a shareholder at the
time of the wrong,29 no court has decreed prorata recovery solely
because some of the shareholders at the time of suit were subsequent
shareholders. The purpose of the rule on standing to sue is to prevent
speculation in litigation and to reduce the likelihood of strike suits;' 0
it is not based on a feeling that it is unfair to permit subsequent share-
holders to benefit from a recovery.
It has been held, however, in the leading case of Home Fire Ins. Co.
v. Barber and in two other cases,3 ' that the corporation itself is barred
from recovery when all the present shareholders are subsequent share-
holders. In that situation, then, it is not possible, in jurisdictions adher-
ing to the Home Fire Ins. Co. rule, to bring a derivative suit either be-
cause subsequent shareholders have no standing to sue or because the
plaintiff in a derivative suit -cannot assert greater rights than those of
his corporation.3 2 On the other hand, the presence of just one contemp-
oraneous shareholder, perhaps the holder of only one share in a large
publicly-held corporation, can lead to the dramatically opposite result
of a full corporate recovery. In such an extreme situation, it seems more
2E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P 23 (b)(i); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61. A shareholder who
would qualify under these statutes will be referred to as a contemporaneous share-
holder. One who would not qualify will be called a subsequent shareholder.
3 See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 951-52, 967
(958).
3iPark Terrace, Inc. v. Burge, 249 N.C. 3o8, io6 S.E.2d 478 (1959), 37 N.C.L. Rev.
320 (1959); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (19o3); Capitol
Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.,d 291 (195o), aff'd
per curiam, So2 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951). In the Home Fire Ins. Co. case the
court specifically noted that the present shareholders had paid a fair consideration
for their stock and were thus not injured by the prior mismanagement. Home
Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, supra at 657, 663, 93 N.W. at io2g, o31. The court in
Pokrass relied upon the lack of standing in the jurisdiction of a subsequent share-
holder to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. The fairness argument of the
Home Fire Ins. Co. case was relied upon in the concurring opinion. Capitol Wine
& Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, supra at 189-9o, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97.
"See Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances,
33 Yale L.J. 58o, 588 (1924). But see Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 2o6,
293 N.Y. Supp. 912, aff'd per curiam, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937) (corporation
barred because m pari delicto as party to contract in restraint of competition, but
shareholder allowed to recover from directors prorata share of corporate damages
on the contract). The Di Tomasso rule would not apply, however, when the bar
against the corporation arises only because of the unfairness of allowing the share-
holders to benefit from a recovery.
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logical and reasonable to decree prorata recovery, and so allow re-
covery only to the single contemporaneous shareholder.
33
Certain factors, however, may point toward the desirability of a
corporate recovery, even when all the present shareholders are subse-
quent shareholders. If the loss of corporate assets remains concealed un-
til shortly before the suit, the substantial injury really falls upon the
present shareholders, whether contemporaneous or subsequent. It is
likely that former shareholders sold out at prices higher than those
obtainable if the wrong had been known. If the suit is against direct-
ors or officers, there is no policy reason for releasing them from lia-
bility if their wrong has caused a present injury to present share-
holders. If the suit is against persons never within the corporation (for
example, persons who allegedly violated a contract with the corpora-
tion), the failure of a prior management to bring suit should not bar
an action regardless of when the breach was discovered and the status
of present shareholders. The rule of Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber*
4
seems inapplicable, since outsiders should be bound by their under-
taking and not be permitted to look behind the corporate entity.
The Home Fire Ins. Co. rule and its extension, through the use
of prorata recovery,35 to the situation where substantially all the
shareholders are subsequent may not be fully operative unless there
is but a single class of common shareholders. It is arguable that bond-
holders36 and preferred shareholders, whether "contemporaneous" or
"'See May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
167 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (i9o3). This case involved breaches of fiduciary
duty by directors and officers of a closely-held corporation. The court itself noted
that, since the "corporation is not asserting or endeavoring to protect a title to
property, it can only maintain a suit in equity as the representative of it stock-
holders...." Id. at 664, 93 N.W at 1o31-32.
3'The same prorata recovery can be obtained even if the corporation itself
brings the suit under a new management. See Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co.,
13o Md. 523, ioo At. 645 (1917).
36The ordinary trade creditor should not be afforded any special rights so long
as he still may enforce his primary cause of action against the corporation. Upon
insolvency in the equity sense, it seems that such a creditor should be able to
prevent any direct prorata recovery by the shareholders. See text after note 55 and
at notes 56-57, infra; Stevens, Private Corporations §§ 167, 168, at 797, 799 (2d ed.
1949). Similarly, the rule of the Home Fire Ins. Co. case itself should be inapplicable,
since in the insolvency situation a corporate recovery is really for the benefit
of creditors, and not the subsequent shareholders. But see Capitol Wine & Spirit
Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (195o), aff'd per curiam, 302
N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951) (amended complaint alleging that suit is solely for
benefit of creditors-government's for unpaid taxes-not permitted; but no indi-
cation of insolvency). It seems that a creditor's knowledge of the wrong when he
extended the credit should be immaterial. Cf. Easton Nat'l Bank v. American Brick
& Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732, 64 Atl. 917 (Ct. Err. & App. i9o6).
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"subsequent," as those terms are used-in this article, are always entitled
to a corporate recovery, i t least to the extent necearv to restore im-
paired capital.3 7 They might even be entitled to a, orate recovery
over and above this amount so as to provide suffick it ;orking capital
to prevent another impairment of capital as a result of current opera-
tions.
Bondholders especially have .strong ground for demanding a
corporate recovery. They are senior to all other interests, and they
cannot enforce their rights until their bonds are mature. Bondholders
as a group should have the continuing right to some corporate re-
covery when capital has been impaired even if all the bonds changed
hands between the occurrence of the wrong and the time of suit. This
argument possesses less force when extended to preferred share-
holders, even if they have a liquidation preference, for they are
corporate risk-takers and entitled to maintain derivative suits to
redress corporate wrongs.38 Nevertheless, they do seem entitled to a
"cushion" argument similar to that of the bondholders.
Even when the capital of the corporation consists entirely of a
single class of common stock and the suit is against corporate in-
siders, prorata recovery may be inappropriate if only a comparatively
small number of the shareholders are subsequent. Logically, the same
rules governing the availability, of prorata recovery should apply
whether a shareholder brings a derivative suit or new management
brings a corporate suit.39 A rigid rule requiring prorata recovery in
such situations would result in the diversion of a considerable amount
of assets away from the corporate treasuries. Such a rule would work
exceptionally great mischief in publicly held corporations with ac-
tively -traded stock; in such corporations some shareholders are almost
always bound to be "subsequent." Furthermore, the great majority
of the shareholders, especially in publicly held corporations, would
probably prefer to have such assets remain in the corporation in
order to produce long-term growth and profitability. Of course,
the amounts received in such a prorata distribution could be re-
invested, but this may not be practicable if each shareholder receives
nCf. Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 13o Md. 523, ioo Ati. 645 (1917).
The court mentioned specifically that there was no showing that the corporation
needed the recovery in order to pay creditors, that the capital was impaired, or that
there would be any injury to the preferred shareholders if pro rata were decreed.
3See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 321 (1936) (voting
preferred); cf. Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
afl'd mem., 27o App. Div. 925, 62 N.YS.2d 76o, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d
818 (1946) (nonvoting participating stock).
NSee note 35 supra.
1962] PRORATA CORPORATE RECOVERIES 175
but a small amount, and it may be inconvenient if a charter amend-
ment is required for the issuance of any new shares necessary for
such reinvestment.
40
If the Home Fire Ins. Co. rule is extended in the breach-of~fiduci-
ary-duty case to the situation in which substantially all the share-
holders are subsequent, and rejected when substantially all the share-
holders are contemporaneous, there will remain difficult problems
of application in intermediate situations when the factors mentioned
above as strongly pointing toward a corporate recovery are lacking.
It is arguable that if no creditors or senior security-holders are preju-
diced, prorata recovery should be decreed whenever it is clear that
the wrongful acts 'could have damaged only the contemporaneous
shareholders. A showing that the subsequent shareholders purchased
at a price depressed because of the wrongs is some evidence of this,
although it is difficult to devise a reliable method for isolating the
impact of the wrong on the price of the shares. The defendants
should have the burden of proving clearly that all the elements justify-
ing prorata recovery, including the clear financial solvency of the
corporation, are present. At some point the number of subsequent
shareholders would be sufficiently large so that the burden be shifted
to those who oppose pro rata to show that the wrong actually injured
subsequent shareholders or that the financial condition of the corpora-
tion requires a corporate recovery. This type of adjustment in the
burden of proof should provide a reasonably workable method for
achieving desirable corporate-law results. Subject to all the foregoing
conditions, therefore, in some circumstances a decree awarding pro-
rata recovery solely because of the presence of subsequent shareholders
in the corporation would be justifiable.
II. RIGHT To REQUEST, OBJECT To, AND SHARE IN PRORATA RECOVERY
A. Standing to Request and Object.
There is no objection to allowing either party to request prorata
recovery in the liquidation situation, since the primary reason for
the request is to afford greater convenience, 41 but in the foreseeable-
"Furthermore, registration of a new issue of shares with the SEC might be
required under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1958), as amended, 15 US.C. § 77b (Supp. II, 1961).
"Compare Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939) (requested by the
plaintiff), with Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd mem., 27o App. Div. 925, 62 N.Y.S.2d 760, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d
8M8 (1946) (requested by the defendant).
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mismanagement situation only the plaintiffs or intervening plaintiffs
should be permitted to make this request. Even though prorata re-
covery appears to diminish the amount of damages recoverable from
the defendants, in most instances the defendants are large shareholders
as well as managers and thus derive proportionate benefit from any
corporate recovery.4 2 Of course, this need not be the case; especially in
a large publicly-held corporation these manager-defendants may own
no shares at all, so that the full amount of damages will be recoverable
regardless of the type of recovery. In any event, it is unlikely that a
court will accept an argument by the defendants in a foreseeable-
mismanagement situation that prorata recovery should be decreed
because "our past terrible record shows we are likely to mismanage
in the future." Furthermore, prorata recovery in this situation is
granted because of the possibility of future losses from mismanage-
ment, rather than because of any right in the defendants to limit the
recovery on the basis of defenses against some of the plaintiff group.
The decreeing of prorata recovery because recovery should be
limited to innocent or contemporaneous shareholders depends en-
tirely upon personal defenses against some shareholders, so that only
the defendants should be permitted to request pro rata" Furthermore,
no policy interest is served by allowing some shareholder-plaintiffs
to allege that other shareholders should be barred from recovery.
Similar considerations apply in the sale-of-control situation. If
the action is conceived of as a corporate cause of action, only the de-
fendants should be able to request prorata recovery. Of course, some
of these suits may be in the nature of individual causes of action
possessed by the noncontrolling shareholders 44
"See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Henry G. Davis &
Co. v. Gemmell, 73 Md. 530, 21 Ad. 712 (1891). As noted in footnote ig, supra, in
the "pure" foreseeable-mismanagement situation, the only shares barred from
participation in the recovery are those held by the individual defendants them-
selves.
"See, e.g., Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 i921); Brown v.
DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897) (per curam on opinion of court below).
But see Note, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 322 n.28 (1935) (interpreting a comment made
by one court).
"Such suits might be considered "spurious" class suits under Federal Rule
23(a)(3), and thus not binding on absentees, since each shareholder would possess
his own separate cause of action. See Moore, Federal Practice par. 23.io, at 3442-5o
(2d ed. 1948). However, in this type of suit there seem to be no reasons of policy
for refusing to permit the common questions arising from the sale to be determined
once and for all in the class suit, provided the test of adequacy of representation
is met, with each member of the class then permitted to come in and prove his
claim. See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 28o-88 (ig5o); Developments-Multi-
party Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 936-39 (1958).
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Shareholder-plaintiffs should have standing to object to prorata
recovery requested by a defendant, whereas it would be incongruous
to honor such an objection by a defendant. 45 Some might agrue that
the plaintiffs should have no standing to object, since they will bene-
fit as much if the recovery goes directly to them rather than to the
corporation. However, even apart from other considerations, 46 a dol-
lar in the hands of the shareholder is not the same as a dollar in the
corporate treasury. The latter possesses a certain dynamism, the pos-
sibility of producing more dollars in profits. The plaintiffs may well,
therefore, as investors prefer a corporate recovery, especially if the
recovery forms a substantial part of corporate assets. 4 7 Furthermore,
plaintiffs should be permitted to ask for a corporate recovery in order
to benefit shareholders not parties, since the representative character
of the suit becomes even more apparent once prorata recovery has
been requested.
The plaintiffs, though, are not likely to represent adequately the
interests of all the absent shareholders. They have no standing to re-
fute the defendants' allegations of personal defenses against some of
the absentees, the basis of the defendants' request for pro rata. More-
over, they may be quite content with prorata recovery, possibly be-
cause they have no interest in a long-term investment 48 or because
they would recover a sizeable sum of money which would then be
available for more profitable investment elsewhere.. Consequently
the personal interests of the plaintiffs may be antagonistic to the
"This incongruity was pointed out in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (19 5 5)- Of course, a defendant may use incon-
gruous arguments, even those pointing to increased liability, in order to ward off
the evil day for payment of any damages-hardly a position that would appeal to
a court of equity. See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 9o (7 th Cir. 1941).
In the liquidation situation, there is no point in permitting anyone to argue
for a corporate recovery, for presumably the court will insure that the rights of
creditors are upheld before allowing shareholders to receive any of the fund after
a prorata recovery is decreed.
'8For example some courts have denied recovery of attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs because the recovery does not benefit the corporation. See, e.g., Joyce v.
Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (192i). However, these cases did not involve
a group of shareholders eligible to share in the recovery large enough to be con-
sidered a class. In at least one case, ibid., the recovery for the plaintiff "class" was
so small that an attorney's fee could not have been taken out of it; thus any suzh
fee would have required an additional recovery from the defendants. However,
if a large enough group of shareholders is involved, the suit should be treated
like any other class suit, with the fees being taken from the fund recovered. See
Perlman v. Feldmann, i6o F. Supp. 31o (D. Conn. 1958); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1314, 1319 (i956).
"See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 947 (1958).
4sSee ibid.
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interests of many of the absentees. A fortiori, the plaintiffs may fail to
represent adequately the interests of others, such a,, I "dholders, with
interests in the corporation.
B. Notification to Persons or Classes not Before the Court.
In view of these possibilities, notification should be given to absent
shareholders of the pendency of the action and the possibility that
prorata recovery will be decreed. 49 When the plaintiffs do not ade-
quately represent all interests any attempt to bind inadequately
represented absentees on the issue of whether prorata recovery should
be decreed may violate due process.5 0 Such notification, with an in-
vitation to intervene, should satisfy due process,51 for it affords an
40See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1316 (1956). But see Chounis .v. Laing, 125 W
Va. 275, 23 SXE. 628 (1942) (notice not necessary because shareholders can intervene
after the decree and still recover); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 Atl. 320
(1937) (court holds failure of shareholders to join in suit is assent to defendants'
acts or waiver of rights). Both of these cases overlook the considerations in favor
of pre-decree notice.
5OCf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Representation may not be adequate
unless the claims and defenses of absentees are actually litigated. See Note, 46
Colum. L. Rev. 8i8, 831 (1946); cf. Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1o65 (1954). It has
been stated that the adequacy of representation and the question of whether to
permit the suit to be maintained as a class suit is or should be within the trial
court's discretion. See Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
ig Cornell L.Q. 399, 433 (1934); Editorial Note, 2 How. L.J. iii, 127 (1956) (by impli-
cation); Comment, 25 Texas L. Rev. 64, 70 (146). But see Weeks v. Bareco Oil
Co., 125 F.2d 84, 93 (7 th Cir. 194i) (dictum) (if facts are undisputed appellate court
can exercise its own judgment). Of course, the trial court's determination is subjecct
to review for abuse of discretion. For suggested tests of whether the representation
is adequate, see Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 938
(1958); Note, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 120, 141-42 (1953).
5 See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 44, at 231 (though should not grant binding
effect to all class suits on basis of notice alone, id. at 276-77); Keeffe, Levy & Dono-
van, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327, 345-49 (1948) (notice alone should
make class suit binding on absentees); Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. gig (1946) (if noti-
fication is given, all class suits should have collateral estoppel effects against
absentees). But see Note, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 472 (1954) (advocates some notice, but
it is not decisive of due process).
In the pro rata situation, notice should be sufficient, since, even if no absentees
enter the suit, their rights will receive some sort of rough representation, provided
some arguments are made both for and against pro rata. Notification will give the
absentees a greater opportunity to enter and have their arguments presented more
sharply. Even if the absentees form sub-classes, notice should suffice, for there will
probably be only a few arguments available to each group; these can be gotten
before the court if only a few out of each group come in. The same reasoning seems
applicable to such special groups as bondholders and preferred shareholders, both
of whom may present only narrowly confined arguments, as indicated in the text.
In any event, on the issue of whether to grant pro rata, the pro rata situation may
be differentiated from other types of class suits from the point of view of most of the
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adequate opportunity to be heard. Stockholders' lists will facilitate
this notification, 52 although these lists may not be fully adequate to
insure notice to all interested parties, for example when prorata re-
covery may be decreed to former shareholders. ,3 If this is a possibility,
in fairness, such former shareholders should be notified and offered the
opportunity to argue for prorata recovery. The best available type
of notification should be used, with publication used only when
identity or whereabouts are unknown.54 Failure to notify a former-
shareholder group may not be as seriou's as failure to notify present
shareholders, some of whom might wish to argue for a corporate re-
covery, since, by hypothesis, the defendants will present arguments
for pro rata,55 and so former shareholders will receive at least rough
representation by the defendants.
Certain groups other than shareholders and former shareholders
should receive notification. In the liquidation situation, of course
all types of creditors should be notified after the decree, but there
is not much point in permitting them to argue for a corporate re-
covery before the decree; thus, they do not need to receive the notice
here under consideration. In the remaining pro rata situations,
ordinary trade creditors probably should not be given standing to
object to prorata recovery, unless they are unable to realize on the
primary obligation of the corporation; insolvency in the equity sense
should be sufficient basis for giving standing to these creditors. Of
course, it is unlikely that either party to the litigation will present
evidence of such insolvency. Even so, no elaborate system to give
absent shareholders: The difference between a direct prorata recovery and a corpor-
ate recovery does not seem as crucial as retaining or losing a cause of action,
as in the usual class-suit situation. Even shareholders who might be in a group
barred by pro rata may be better off than absentees in other class-suit situations,
since they will be able to contend individually after the decree that they should
be within the claimant group, whereas in other class suits once the class loses no
member gets a second chance. Therefore, it seems that notice should suffice to
bind absentees to the court's determination to grant pro rata, even if such notice
without more would not be sufficient in other class suits.
i2See Perlman V. Feldmann, 16o F. Supp. 31o (D. Conn. 1958).
OSee text at notes 68-72, infra.
rCf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
sln the foreseeable-mismanagement situation, it is true that the plaintiffs would
present the argument for prorata recovery, but only the defendants could argue
for barring subsequent shareholders from participation in the recovery. If the
defendants so argue, the former shareholders would most likely receive notice after
the decree to-come in and claim, if appropriate. See text at notes 85-86 infra. If only
the plaintiffs argue for prorata in this situation, the subsequent-shareholder issue
would not arise; therefore, as a matter of sound judicial administration, it seems
that if former shareholders want to obtain part of the recovery, they should be left
to whatever right to intervene that they might have.
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notice to such creditors is necessary, since hidden insolvency does
not occur frequently, and courts are likely to prot, creditors when
insolvency is known or suspectedV3 Perhaps it would be desirable to
give a general notice by publication of the suit and the possibility of
prorata recovery.57 If a creditor does appear before the decree is
rendered, he should be permitted to argue for a corporate recovery
solely on the ground of insolvency.
Bondholders seem to be in a stronger position to object to pro-
rata recovery, since they have no present right of action against the
corporation. They should be permitted to demand elimination of any
impairment of capital.58 If the jurisdiction permits "nimble dividends"
to be paid from the net profits of the current or recent accounting
period,59 the question may arise whether such a statute destroys the
bondholders' standing to object to a prorata recovery.60 It might be
argued that the statutory term "net profits" should be construed to
mean profits arising from the operations of the business; thus a re-
covery in the suit would not be "net profits." Even if this term is
broad enough to encompass recoveries in litigation, however, such
6See, e.g., Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., i3o Md. 523, 19o Ad. 645
(1917) (court mentions that there was no allegation that the money was needed for
creditors); Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (corporation dissolved; court mentions that creditors have
been paid).
57Cf. Johnson v. Waters, iii Us. 640 (1884) (notification to creditors by news-
paper after decree in creditors' bill); Berger, "Disregarding the Corporation Entity"
for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 8o8, 823 (1955).
"See text at notes 36-37, supra. Normally there could not be a fresh impair-
ment of capital through prorata recovery, since the asset involved, the cause of
action, is not likely to appear on the balance sheet. Moreover, if the corporate
assets involved in the suit still appear on the balance sheet even though no longer
possessed by the corporation, pro rata still would do no more than to confirm an
existing impairment.
"0E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 15oo(b); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 17o(a)(2) (1953).
See generally Dodd & Baker, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1157-63 (2d ed.
1951).
8"Such recovery has been characterized as a "forced" payment of a dividend.
See Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 125 App. Div. 881, io N.Y. Supp. 8o6 (igoB);
Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1315-16 (1956). This statement seems to envision pro-
rata recovery as if the funds go first to the corporation, usually contrary to actual
fact. However, the contention appears to have much force if the corporate cause of
action is shown on the balance sheet, or if the misappropriated assets are still
shown thereon. It has force in any event if the term "dividend" is not taken in
a technical sense. See note 13 supra. Perhaps the dividend statute would not liter-
ally apply to pro rata unless the cause of action were shown on the balance sheet,
and perhaps not even then because of the absence of corporate action. However,
the party requesting pro rata might attempt to argue by analogy from the statute
so as to defeat the objections of the bondholders-probably without too great a
chance for success in view of the bondholders' contract with the corporation.
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a statute may refer only to dividends paid through normal corporate
action, and not to distributions, possibly analogous to dividends,
ordered by a court. Therefore, it seems that such a statute should not
affect the standing of the bondholders to object. As in the case when
equity insolvency is present, it is unlikely that either side in the suit
will offer evidence of an impairment of capital.61 Consequently, bond-
holders should receive some sort of personal notice.
62
Similar arguments relating to an impairment of capital are avail-
able to preferred shareholders. They have an analogous "cushion"
argument, especially when they have a liquidation preference. In ad-
dition, their standing to object to prorata recovery for the common
shareholders should be absolutely clear when there are arrearages
on cumulative preferred dividends. Any such recovery to the common
without providing for the payment of such arrearages violates the
contract among the shareholders inter sese. Even the holder of non-
cumulative preferred without a liquidation preference should have
standing to object to prorata recovery in order to insure that assets will
be available in the future to pay his noncumulative dividend and to
give him something on liquidation. This last argument is especially
cogent if a preferred shareholder is permitted to share in a prorata
recovery only to the extent that he is entitled to dividends under his
contract with the corporation. Alternatively, provided no senior securi-
ty is prejudiced, perhaps the preferred shareholders should receive
so much of the prorata recovery as will return to them capital pro-
portionate to the amount by which the common is impaired. How-
ever, this compounds the evil of a capital impairment and may under-
mine the notion of a capital measuring rod. Permitting the preferred
to argue for a corporate recovery seems preferable. In a sale-of-control
case, it might be argued that a holder of nonvoting preferred should
have no standing to oppose pro rata since he has no voice in control.
This argument has force if used to prevent such a holder from join-
ing in a nonderivative class suit by noncontrolling shareholders, seek-
ing an individual recovery. However, the use of the derivative suit in
this situation presupposes the existence of some corporate asset or
61This is true, unless, of course, impairment of capital is involved in the actual
litigation.
"Since a hidden capital impairment seems not likely to occur frequently, per-
haps notice by mail should be sent to only a fraction of the bondholders, with the
remainder being notified through publication, if that would be less expensive.
In the foreseeable-mismanagement situation, it seems that courts should be
very sympathetic to the bondholders' request for a receivership to protect whatever
corporate recovery they manage to obtain.
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opportunity as the basis of the sult,6 3 and so a preferred shareholder
should have the same standing he has in any othei p - rata situation,
and should receive individual notice.
Even though all these notifications appear desirable, the cost of
providing them, even by ordinary mail, may be high, especially in a
large publicly-held corporation. The allocation of this cost might well
have a practical effect on the type of remedy sought. In the first in-
stance, it would seem that the cost of such notice should be borne
by the party requesting prorata recovery, since it is his request that
produces the need for the notice.64 However, since the purpose of the
notice is to give absentees the opportunity of arguing for a corporate
recovery, it may be argued that the corporation should bear the ex-
pense of notice.65 Actually, though, the notice is not given for the
benefit of the corporation, but rather for the benefit of absentees
who may be interested in a corporate recovery. On the other hand,
since the parties to the suit and the persons receiving notice repre-
sent virtually the totality of interests in the corporation, perhaps at
least some part of the burden should be borne by the corporation. 66
When the defendants request pro rata, perhaps the cost of notice
should be divided equally between them and the corporation. The de-
fendants should bear some of the burden because they made the
original demand for pro rata and stand to benefit 'from decreased
damages; yet, at least some of the expense should fall upon those
'3See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955)-
"Cf. Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1o59, 1o65 (1954) (in class suits, burden should
always be on the plaintiff); Note, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 12o, 136 (1953). But cf. Gordon,
The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42
Ill. L. Rev. 518, 529 (1947); Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
874, 938 (1958) (might in some circumstances m class suits shift burden to the
defendants).
e6Cf. d. at 938 n.462 (corporation bears expense of notice in ordinary derivative
suit). Cases which deny to the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees because the recovery
does not go to the corporation, e.g., Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29
(1921), may not be in point here, since the primary import of the notice is to enable
persons not otherwise before the court to present arguments for a corporate
recovery.
"Even though all interests in the corporation may be affected to some extent
because of corporate payment of such expenses, the burden of such costz
appears to fall most heavily on the common shareholders, for bond interest and
preferred dividends must be satisfied prior to payment of dividends on the common.
However, senior interests could be burdened considerably if the corporation is in
difficult financial circumstances. In any event, bondholders and preferred share-
holders should bear a lesser part of the burden, since they are likely to gain less
from a corporate recovery than the junior interests and may oppose prorata recovery
on only limited grounds and to a limited extent.
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who will benefit from the notice. Even though not exact, this division
of the expenses will approximate the desired result and will be easy to
administer. When the plaintiffs seek pro rata in the foreseeable-mis-
management situation, the corporation should bear the entire ex-
pense. Both sides to the litigation are likely to derive benefit from
prorata recovery-albeit for differing reasons. Since the defendants
are frequently substantial shareholders, allocating the entire burden
to the corporation will be equitable, yet easy to administer. 67 In the
liquidation situation, notice prior to the decree seems unnecessary;
but if any is required, the cost should be taken out of the fund before
the court, since th decreeing of pro rata is a. matter of convenience
and is merely a short cut to the ultimate result of a corporate recovery.
In any event, in all these situations the court should be empowered
to allocate this expense according to the equities in the individual case.
C. Right to Share in a Prorata Recovery
Prima facie, the plaintiffs and all other common shareholders not
barred because of personal defenses of the defendants against them
should be entitled to share in a prorata recovery. However, at least
two questions concerning the common shareholders must be an-
swered: (i) Assuming that prorata recovery is decreed on some ground
other than mere presence of subsequent shareholders, should subse-
quent shareholders be barred from recovery? (2) Even if subsequent
shareholders are not barred as a group, should some former share-
holders be substituted for some present subsequent shareholders?
67ln this situation, if the defendants own no shares, they will not benefit from
any reduced liability (unless they too can claim prorata recovery on another
ground). By charging the corporation with the entire cost, the burden will fall
predominantly upon the real beneficiaries of the recovery-the common shareholders
represented by the plaintiffs-although indirectly. When the defendants do own
shares, they would share in this indirect burden, but they receive the benefit of
not being forced to pay some of the damages. This is a real advantage, especially if
the financial condition of the corporation is not very strong, even though they
would have a proportionate interest in what they restore to the corporation if
a corporate recovery were decreed.
When it is the defendants who request pro rata, it does not seem inequitable
to charge one half of the expense to them even if they are substantial shareholders
in the corporation. The bulk of the burden will thus fall upon the defendants,
but they have the most to gain through pro rata. It is true that this arrangement
would not place any of the burden upon former shareholders. However, the de-
fendants may- benefit from the arguments for pro rata offered by such persons
and may need them in order to prove that the impact of the wrongful acts fell
solely upon the former holders. This will benefit the defendants if they can thus
bar some present shareholders and still cut out some of the former holders through
various personal defenses.
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Since pro rata is decreed anyway, there is no need to consider the
subsequent shareholders as a group, and thus the analysis used to de-
termine whether pro rata should be decreed solely because of the
presence of subsequent shareholders68 is inappropriate. Any number
can be excluded without inconvenience, and therefore each share-
holder's case should be examined on its merits.
Because of the wrongful acts, some of the present shareholders
may have purchased at a lower price than they would otherwise have
paid. If so, it may be argued that a former contemporaneous share-
holder, who sold without knowledge of the wrong, should share in
the recovery rather than his purchaser.69 This can be rationalized on
the ground that, if permitted to recover, the subsequent shareholder
will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the innocent, unknowing,
contemporaneous shareholder. Such a substitution should not depend
upon the subsequent shareholder's knowledge of 'the wrong,70 but
the case for substitution is even stronger if the subsequent share-
holder had knowledge of the wrong while his seller did not. The
right to substitution becomes more doubtful if both purchaser and
seller had knowledge of the wrong at the time of sale. It is possible
that, even though the purchase price was lower than it would have
been had there been no wrong, part of the consideration was for
the possibility that the corporation might some day 'recover for the
wrong. If so, it seems that the former shareholder should be excluded.
Of course, it may be impossible to determine whether any of the
consideration was so allocated. The court must then weigh the equities
between the parties. If it is found that the former shareholder was
fully aware of his personal loss because of the wrong and that he
sold because he did not want to risk further loss, it seems more equi-
table not to allow him to be substituted for the present subsequent
6 See part I C., supra.
"oCf. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956) (factor of lack of knowledge
stressed in nonderivative suit by former shareholder to recover his proportionate
share of corporate damages).
"'The result of any given case should not differ solely because the shareholder
at the time of the suit is removed by several mesne conveyances from the holder
of the shares at the time of the wrong. Unless otherwise indicated, the "subsequent
shareholder" referred to in the text is the actual purchaser from the contempor-
aneous shareholder. Except as indicated, a later subsequent purchaser stands in the
shoes of his predecessor. For a discussion of this problem, see Developments-
Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 948-49 (1958).
Even if pro rata is decreed solely because of the presence of subsequent share-
holders, the question of whether the contemporaneous shareholders should be sub-
stituted for any or all of the present subsequent holders must be considered on an
individual basis. Moreover, it is possible that some of the subsequent shareholders
might recover, even though their group as a whole is prima facie barred.
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shareholder. If the court finds that the former shareholder, although
he knew of the wrong, was not fully aware of its effect upon him,
perhaps the equities point toward a recovery for him. Similarly, if
the seller had full knowledge of the wrong, but the subsequent-share-
holder-purchaser had no knowledge, the subsequent shareholder may
prevail over him; but less than full knowledge on the part of the
seller may lead to the opposite result. In any event, if the defend-
ants can show that recovery by the subsequent shareholder would in-
volve a windfall and that the former shareholder waived his rights or
relinquished them to his purchaser, the defendants should not be re-
quired to pay either claimant. The defendants. should be liable to the
present shareholder only to the extent that the wrongful act injured
him.
If the subsequent shareholder paid a consideration to the con-
temporaneous shareholder equal to what would have been paid had
there been no wrong, it seems that the subsequent shareholder should
recover.71 A recovery by the former shareholder would unjustly en-
rich him, whereas denial of all recovery whatsoever would seem to
enrich the defendants unjustly; for, by paying a full consideration, the
subsequent shareholder has taken upon himself the impact of the
defendants' wrong against the corporation. In all these variations of
this situation, very difficult problems of valuation are likely to be
presented to the court.72 Yet, this approach seems more likely to
2Compare text following note 33 and at note 34, supra. If the present share-
holder is one removed by several mesne conveyances from the contemporaneous
shareholder, an attempt should be made to determine whether he paid a full con-
sideration, as described in the text. If so, this should be determinative rather
than the consideration paid by the original subsequent shareholder. Perhaps the
most difficult case would anse when the present subsequent shareholder has paid
a full consideration, but the former contemporaneous shareholder received a
price depressed because of the wrong, the real gain thus going to some intermediate
subsequent shareholder. In this case, the court should strive to protect the present
shareholder, for example, by placing a greater burden upon the contemporaneous
shareholder to show that he did not fully understand the impact of the wrong-
ful acts upon him and did not merely want to avoid further risk of loss. If the
equities are perfectly balanced, however, perhaps the defendants should be com-
pelled to recompense both for their loss, since the wrongful acts have in fact injured
both. This is likely to occur so infrequently that it does not seem unfair to im-
pose this burden upon the defendants. However, the defendants might be given
a defense against the present shareholder, although liable to the contemporaneous
holder, if they can prove that the price paid by the present holder depended
solely upon independent market factors operating after the wrong was known or
could have been known by buyers and sellers.
"'Courts, though, have solved difficult valuation problems. See, e.g., Perlman
v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
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achieve substantial justice than a blanket rule of excluding or includ-
ing subsequent shareholders.
Trade creditors of the corporation should have no right to share in
any prorata recovery, but if the corporation is insolvent in the equity
sense, they should be able to prevent such recovery until they are
paid.73 Although bondholders may be able to prevent prorata recovery
until an impairment of capital is corrected, it does not seem that
they would be entitled to any of the principal on the bonds under the
bond indenture until maturity. However, they should be permitted
to collect arrearages in interest payments before any payments are
made to the shareholders. Preferred shareholders may be in a some-
what different position; they are equity holders and risk-takers. But
since they are entitled to receive only limited dividends, whether
cumulative or not, they should share in a prorata recovery only to
the extent of such dividends, payable at the time of suit but not yet
paid, and should not be entitled to any return of capital. 74
III. PROCEDURE AFTER THE DECREE
If a closely-held corporation is involved in the suit, no substantial
mechanical difficulties should arise after prorata recovery is decreed.
Normally only a single class of common shares exists, and all the share-
holders either are parties or can be easily joined.j 5 In such cases,
courts have had no difficulty in making the distribution of damages,
usually through a master.70 No unfamiliar problems are presented.
As previously noted, Perlman v. Feldmann77 was the first pro rata
case involving a corporation whose shares were widely held. The
73See text at notes 56-57, supra. For a fuller discussion of the rights of bond-
holders, see text at notes 58-62, supra.
7lSee text at and around note 63, supra. This right would extend to any divi-
dends not paid at the time of decree and arguably might include dividends for
the entire current year, even though not yet payable, if it appears that they might
not otherwise be paid. In the liquidation situation, these shareholders should re-
ceive out of the fund collected only what they are entitled to by contract on
liquidation; of course, all senior security interests and trade creditors must first be
satisfied out of the fund if they are not otherwise paid.
5See, e.g., Spaulding v. North Milwaukee Town Site Co., 1o6 Wis. 481, 81 N.W
1o64 (i900).
"'See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927). In Eaton v. Robin-
son, ig R.I. 146, 31 Atl. io58 (1895) (per cunam), the court avoided problems
of distribution by awarding judgment only to those shareholders before the court.
However, this would force the remaining shareholders to commence future actions,
with possible statute-of-limitations difficulty.
79ig F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (i955). This case, apparently,
did not present any of the problems arising from the existence of bondholders, pre-
ferred shareholders, or ordinary creditors.
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final order merely provided for the clerk to send notice to all stock-
holders appearing on a list submitted to the court, apparently without
in examination of the status of those holders.7" Thus; the problem
of effecting the distribution remained simple.
When the distribution is more complex, it may be possible to
include in the notice given prior to the decree 79 a statement of when
to present claims after the decree. However, the exact date of the
decree will be very difficult to estimate, especially if many persons
appear to contest the granting of prorata recovery. Therefore, a sec-
ond notice-after the decree-will probably be needed. Since a pro
rata case after the-,decree is not different from an ordinary class suit,
the normal class-suit rule placing the burden of giving notice upon the
plaintiffs, with the costs being taken from the fund recovered, should
be followed.8 0 Unlike notice before the decree, when the primary issue
is whether or not to grant pro rata, the corporation as a whole is not
involved; this notice after decree is entirely for the benefit of those
who might claim a share in the recovery.
The actual machinery for effecting distribution could be the same
as that worked out for use in an ordinary class suit:81 (i) The court
enters an interlocutory order or decree for the plaintiffs of record
and all similarly situated who come in prior to a specified deadline.
(2) A master is appointed, to whom the defendants are compelled
to give whatever names and addresses of absentees they have in their
possession. This is important if former shareholders are to partici-
pate in the recovery, for the defendants may be able to provide records
giving their identity. Of course, the defendants will be compelled to
turn over the current stockholder lists, if in their possession and if
they have not done so for the purpose of prior notification. (3) The
plaintiffs' attorney or the master submits the forms for proof of claims
with explanatory material to the judge for approval and then mails
them to the absentees. (4) The absentees are required to file their claims
716o F. Supp. 3io, 311 (D. Conn. 1958). The court did not raise the problem
of the existence of subsequent shareholders, although in fact almost all the shares
were held by one subsequent shareholder at the time of the decree. Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Review. 1, 3 n.i2 (1956).
7See part II B., supra.
"See Perlman v. Feldmann, 16o F. Supp. 31o, 312 (D. Conn. 1958); Wheaton,
supra note 5o, at 438-39, 440 (the class-suit rule).
81See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 693-94 (1941). The main outlines of the authors' proposal are
presented in the text. The authors regard this procedure as the "maximum com-
plexity" permissible for class suits. Id. at 694. See also Backus v. Finkelstein, 23
F.2d 357, 366 (D. Minn. 1927).
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within a prescribed period. The defendants are permitted to file ob-
jections raising personal defenses, but not the common questions
settled in the main suit. (5) The master hears objections and de-
termines the individual damages. (6) Upon submission of the master's
report, the court hears objections and then renders a final decree
ordering the defendants to pay. The court reserves jurisdiction until
the end of the distribution.
The use of this machinery presents no great difficulty when the
extent of the damages recoverable from the defendants depends en-
tirely upon the number of present shareholders who prove their
claims, only the liability per share having been determined during
the suit. The defendants should have the burden of proving per-
sonal defenses against the claimants, who are merely required to es-
tablish their identity as shareholders. In most instances, the defendants
should be able to prove acquiescence readily enough through the
records of shareholders' meetings; it seems that once such records
are introduced, the claimants should have the burden of going for-
ward to show that their apparent acquiescence was not real. The de-
fendants, however, should have the ultimate burden of persuasion
since they stand to benefit from a reduced recovery. 2
More difficulty will be encountered if former contemporaneous
and present subsequent shareholders compete for the recovery. In
order to prevent a double recovery (by both the former and present
shareholders), it may be necessary for the court to ascertain the total
amount of damages that could possibly be recovered from the defen-
dants.83 The court might then merely pay out the fund on a first-
come-first-served basis. This haphazard system, however, would hardly
carry out the equitable purposes of prorata recovery. It has been
suggested that a presumption against recovery by the subsequent
shareholders should be established until they show that they are en-
titled to the recovery in a proceeding of which the former share-
holders have notice.8 4 However, since it will usually be predictable
that some former shareholders will be entitled to recover,85 and this
can be indicated in the interlocutory decree, the general post-decree
"But see Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 948 (1958).
The result should be the same in the foreseeable-mismanagement situation: All
the shareholders other than the defendants would recover directly from the
defendants unless they prove personal defense against some.
"'Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955), on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957). However, in one
situation a double recovery might be desirable. See note 71 supra.
8'Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 949 (1958).
This is especially true in the sale-of-control cases.
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notification to all possible claimants should suffice. If the identity
of some of the former shareholders is unknown, presumably because
of sales on stock exchanges, notice by publication could be used; such
a notice would identify the period during which the shareholders
could be considered "contemporaneous." Of course, every effort should
be made to trace a chain of title back from a present shareholder to a
contemporaneous holder. If, however, the original post-decree notice
by publication presents the only means of finding the contemporan-
eous holder, that notice should specify the date by which such a holder
must come forward.8 6 After that date, the court should determine the
equities as between the remaining present subsequent shareholders
and the defendanis; s7 if it is determined that these shareholders suf-
fered no injury from the defendants' acts, the defendants' liability
would be reduced pro tanto.
IV SOME EFFECTS OF GRANTING PRORATA RECOVERY
The preceding discussion has focused upon some of the implica-
tions arising from the possibility of a prorata recovery. Now some
inquiry must be made into the nature of the suit once pro rata is de-
creed. Does the suit remain essentially derivative in character, or does
it become some type of class action? If the latter, at least in situations
in which the plaintiffs can request pro rata initially, should the plain-
tiffs be excused from complying with the procedural requirements for
derivative suits?s s The first question may be somewhat misleading,
for the ordinary derivative suit is certainly a type of representative
suit.8 9 Nevertheless, at least for the purpose of notification to ab-
sentees and distribution of the recovery, the suit seems to be treated
'See Wheaton, supra note 50, at 439. If the contemporaneous holder does
come forward, the defendants should be allowed at that time to argue against
recovery by either claimant, provided they do not rely on defenses already decided
against them in the main suit.
87If prorata recovery is decreed solely because of the presence of subsequent
shareholders, this question would have been settled during the main suit, unless
some, but not all, such shareholders can prove that they were the ones harmed
by the wrongful acts. See text at notes 68-72, supra.
"This may be especially crucial in states which require security for costs from
certain plaintiffs in derivative suits. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b. See Gold-
stein v. Weisman, 185 F. Supp. 242, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 196o) (problem hinted at,
but not faced).
"'See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit; Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 98o, 989 (i957); Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and
Individual Grievances, 33 Yale L. J. 58o, 583 (1924) (but it is primarily derivative, id.
at 584). But see McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 Geo. L.J.
878, 901-04 (1938); Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits; Are They Class Actions?,
42 Iowa L. Rev. 568 (1957).
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the same as other kinds of class suits.9 0 On the other hand, even when
the plaintiffs are entitled to requst prorata recovery in their com-
plaint, the action must still be viewed as brought i the right of the
corporation, and not in the right of individuals. 91 I- _.ems, therefore,
that the plaintiffs should be required to comply with the requirements
for bringing a derivative sUit.9 2 Otherwise, plaintiffs could. avoid these
requirements simply by requesting, direct prorata recovery. Of course,
it could be argued that if the plaintiffs failed to obtain pro rata
under such a complaint, they should simply be thrown out of court;
thus the action might be viewed as nonderivative. However, this would
be a poor method of judicial administration. It would be preferable
to dispose of the corporate cause of action completely once it is brought
before the court, especially in view of the possibility that the plain-
tiffs may be the only shareholders who desire a prorata recovery.
Since the derivative suit with a prorata recovery, though initially
treated as an ordinary derivative suit, is best treated after decree in the
same manner as nonderivative class suits, there is good reason to view
this as a sui generis type of action.93 Because the prorata remedy reach-
es more equitable results in certain cases,94 categorization into any rigid
form after the decree is undesirable; in particular, rigid categoriza-
tion according to the types of class suits provided in Federal Rule 2S(a)
should be avoided. Thus, if a closely-held corporation is involved,
there is no need to apply any kind of class-suit concept to the action
after prorata recovery has been decreed. 95 Furthermore, even though
in the ordinary derivative suit a single shareholder who prosecutes
the suit with proper competence and vigor96 quite adequately repre-
"OSee Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 81, at 692 n.26.
'See Stevens, Private Corporaitons § 167, at 784, 796 (2d ed. 1949); Note, 40
Calif. L. Rev. 127, 131 n4o 0(1952). But see Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate
Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 8o8 (1955); Comment, 46
Ill. L. Rev. 937 (1952).
"2See Note, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 127, 131 (1952); cf. Berger, supra note 91, at 823
(some procedural safeguards in derivative suits should be applied to the individual
class suit proposed therein).
"Compare Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 854 (3 d Cir. 1945); Rahl,
The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 119, 134 (1942) (FLSA class suits are a sui generis type of
action).
"See, e.g., May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (ist Cir.), cert. denied,
314 US. 668 (i94i) (large long-settled interests in former corporate assets pro-
tected through use of pro rata).
9In fact, it may be improper to do so. Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litiga-
tion, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 937 (1958) (size of class).
"See Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 233, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942) (by implica-
tion).
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sents the interests of all the shareholders, the court should make a fresh
analysis of the plaintiff's ability to represent the possibly many di-
vergent interests in the corporation concerning the very issue of
whether pro rata should be decreed.97
For the purpose of the statute of limitations the normal derivative-
suit rule should apply;98 then a claimant is not barred because the
statute had run on the corporate cause of action prior to the time
when he individually submitted his claim.99 The opposite rule would
permit the defendants to escape liability to many, if not all, claimants
simply because the court declared prorata recovery at or near the
expiration of the period of limitations. The policy against stale claims
certainly would not require this windfall to the defendants, since
the commencement of the suit informs them of the possibility of these
claims, and indeed of the possibility of the larger liability of a cor-
porate recovery.
The res judicata effects flowing from the pro rata suit must simi-
larly be worked out apart from a preconceived mold. Issues relating
to the merits of the claim against the defendants should follow the
normal rules of res judicata in derivative suits; that is, absentees
should be bound on issues relating to the merits whether or not act-
ually litigated and regardless of the notice sent to them.10 0 However,
only those to whom notice is sent should be bound by the court's
determination to grant prorata recovery.101 If the court rejects pro
ITFor a discussion of these possibly divergent interests, see part II B., supra.
Thus among those who would ultimately oppose the defendants on the merits
there may hardly be a single homogeneous class represented by the plaintiffs. Cf.
Comment, 25 Texas L. Rev. 64, 70-73 (1946) (discussion of problem of sub-classes).
risSee generally Baker & Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 683-86 (3d
ed. 1958) (no statutes distinguished between derivative suits and suits by the corpor-
ation, though the former raise special problems); Note, Statute of Limitations and
Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 56 Colum. L. Rev. io6 (i956).
9nThis same rule is advocated for all class suits: The statute is tolled once suit
is brought, and each class member can share in the recovery even though the
statute would bar his separate individual suit. See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra
note 51, at 339-42; Gordon, supra note 64 at 531 n.79 (advocates tolling even if suit
is later dismissed or compromised).
There might be such a bar if the pro rata suit were viewed as resulting ulti-
mately in a kind of "spurous" class action like the suit under federal rule 23(a)(3).
See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 267-68, 283 (i95o). But see Moore, Federal
Practice par. 23.12, at 3476 (2d ed. 1948).
icoSee Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 956 (1958);
Note, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 136-37 (1934). However, notice is required in some
jurisdictions when the suit is compromised or dismissed. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P
23(c).
"'iSee note 51 supra; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 824
(1926). Notice by publication should be sufficient to bind unknown persons. See
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 51, at 347-48 (alternative suggestion to jurisdic-
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rata, this determination should bind the absentees whether or not
notice has been sent, for the primary purpose of this notice is to en-
able those who oppose the pro rata remedy to argue for a corporate
recovery; thus when a corporate recovery is decreed, the ordinary
derivative-suit rules should apply.'0 2 On the issue of damages no
tion by notice alone that the court might take jurisdiction in rem, the res being
the class claim, id. at 348 n.53); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) (quasi in rem suit). But see Letter from George W. Pepper to
Arthur J. Keeffe, 33 Cornell L.Q. 349, 35 (1948) (may need more individualized
notice). In the pro rata situation, the only group likely to contain many unknown
persons is that of former shareholders, who cannot be harmed by the court's
granting prorata recovery, since, without a prorata recovery, they could not share
at all in the recovery; furthermore, they will be given the best available post-decree
notice. Therefore, binding such persons to a grant of pro rata through notice by
publication does not appear prejudicial or unfair.
It is difficult to conceive of a workable remedy for. a shareholder who is en-
titled to individual notice, but does not receive it, and is thus not bound by the
decision to grant prorata, rather than corporate, recovery. Perhaps he could seek
to enjoin the distribution to the shareholders if it has not yet occurred until he is
heard on the question whether to grant prorata recovery; however, this situation
is unlikely to occur because such a shareholder is not likely to receive post-
decree notice either. Perhaps he could bring a later derivative suit against all who
received part of the recovery and against the former defendants for the balance due
the corporation on the original cause of action. If the number who received the
recovery is large, the suit might be maintained as a class suit against a defendant
class. Even if this solution might be accepted as workable-which seems doubtful,
a rule of law permitting the question of whether to grant prorata recovery to be
relitigated by a single shareholder seems dubious. The corporation itself, which
was a party to the original suit, might be held bound by the determination not to
grant a corporate recovery. In any event, it does not seem that such a shareholder
should be permitted to make any kind of a collateral attack on the judgment in
the original suit, whether such attack be made in the same state where the original
judgment was rendered or in some other state. However, in order to give some
teeth to the notice requirement, perhaps the prorata decree itself should provide
for reopening within a given time (e.g., one year) by a shareholder who was entitled
to individual notice, but did not receive it. This would not only give effect to
the notice requirement, but would provide a definite date for the final termination
of the litigation. The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to any other type
of individual, such as a bondholder, who might be held entitled to receive individ-
ualized notice.
'Ihis question of binding effect could arise only if the court failed to give
the pre-decree notice that should normally be available if pro rata is requested.
Some courts, though, might prefer to avoid the bother of notice if they determine
that the case for pro rata is very weak.
Normally it would seem that a corporate recovery would not. harm any of the
absentees. However, it is true that some absentees might want to argue for pro
rata on the ground of foreseeable mismanagement. If the plaintiffs fail to argue
properly for pro rata, the proper remedy appears to be intervention on the ground
of lack of adequacy of representation. Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 874, 955 (x958). Furthermore, a corporate recovery prima facie pro-
tects all the interests in the corporation. On the other hand, if pro rata is decreed
and some of the absentees are barred from recovery, these absentees suffer an
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problem should arise: if pro rata is decreed, the pre-decree notice
should be sufficient to bind all the absentees; if pro rata is not decreed,
the ordinary derivative-suit rule that all are bound regardless of no-
tice may be applied.
The question remains whether nonresident absentees, even if they
receive proper notice, can constitutionally be bound by a state-court
determination whether or not to grant prorata recovery. In the or-
dinary derivative suit, this problem has never arisen, probably because
of the requirement of actually bringing the corporation itself into
the suit. However, on the issue of whether to grant pro rata, the use-
fulness of relying upon the corporate entity vanishes, and divergent
interests within the corporation must be considered separately. If the
issue of pro rata is raised but a corporate recovery is decreed, the
ordinary derivative-suit procedure should be followed. If pro rata is
decreed, it may be argued that, even if in some class-action situations
state courts could not constitutionally bind nonresident absentees,
the state court should be able to bind all here, provided proper notice
is given, since it initially acquired plenary jurisdiction over the corpo-
rate cause of action. This argument may fail, however, since there
is nothing to bar a nonresident from commencing his own deriva-
immediate and irrevocable loss. Therefore, the need for pre-decree notice is far
greater when pro rata is ultimately decreed.
It is true that former shareholders might want to argue for prorata, since
this is their only way to benefit from the recovery, unless they are restored to the
status of present shareholders, for example, though rescission of a sale, see, e.g.,
Goodliffe v. Colonial Corp., 107 Utah 488, 155 P.-d 177 (1945) (plaintiffs in deriva-
tive suit permitted to reestablish selves as shareholders of record). The former share-
holders might seem more in need of notice that a corporate recovery is to be
granted than do the present shareholders who wish to argue that the case presents
a foreseeable mismanagement situation. Nevertheless, they do not seem to have
standing to raise the defendants' personal defenses against some present share-
holders, even if they might compete with some of the present shareholders after
a pro rata decree; and the foreseeable-mismanagement argument is clearly not open
to them. Therefore, they should be entitled to pre-decree notice only in the sale-of-
control situation and possibly in the subsequent-shareholder situation. In the
latter situation, notice might not be essential since the defendants will most likely
make the same arguments for pro rata as those available to the former shareholders.
However, testimony from some of the former shareholders might be necessary in
order to establish the defendants' contention that the injury was done only to the
former shareholders, although notice given for this purpose to only some of these
former holders should not be determinative of the binding effect of the court's de-
termination upon these absentees. In any event, the former shareholders might have
some recourse through ordinary intervention. For discussion of the need for notice
to these former holders in order to bind them when pro rata is ultimately granted,
see text at notes 53-55, supra.
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tive suit in another jurisdiction prior to the decree in the first suit.103
Moreover, to contend that a court has acquired "p, .ry ju;risdiction"
is to beg the question of whether the court has the power to bind
the absentees once conflicts of interest because of pro rata become
possible. In any event, even though there may be some doubt, indi-
cations seem to be that state courts can bind nonresident absentees
in ordinary class suits, 104 and thus should have the same power here.
V. SOME PROBLEMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Application of the Rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.1 05
In cases in which the corporate cause of action is based upon a
state-created right, the question arises whether a federal court that
has jurisdiction solely because of diversity of citizenship must follow
state law in determining whether to grant prorata recovery. First,
let us assume that the highest court of the state in which the federal
district court is sitting has held squarely that prorata recovery will
not be granted in the type of case before the federal court. 106 It may be
argued that the pro rata device is simply one remedy available to a
federal court of equity,107 and that the federal court is free to grant
an equitable remedy even though the state court would not.108 Thus
when the case involves a choice among different remedies-corporate
recovery versus prorata recovery-rather than the question of the
availability of any remedy at all, it might be contended that the fed-
tmCf. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 194o)
(several suits commenced in federal and state courts within the same state); Whea-
ton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Cornell L.Q. 399, 426
(i934.) Wheaton would not permit separate suits by members of the class during
the pendency of the class suit. Id. at 438. A similar suggestion has been made con-
cerning derivative suits. See McLaughlin, supra note 89, at 9o3 . However, there
may be some difficulty in preventing a nonresident from beginning another suit in
another jurisdiction, a point not discussed by either author.
:'"See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940) (dictum); Developments-Multi-
party Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 940 (1958); Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. io5g,
i067"68 (1954).
'13o4 U-S. 64 (i938).
O'eSuch a situation might occur in Delaware. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.
Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 9o4 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
'Cf. Spaulding v. North Milwaukee Town Site Co., 1o6 Wis. 481, 496, 81 N.W.
1o64. io69 (igoo) (dictum) (granting of prorata recovery involves an equitable
power of the court). Even though pro rata is a type of remedy, it does not follow
that it must be classified as "procedural" for the purpose of the Erie doctrine.
Cf. Sampson v. Channell, 11o F.2d 754 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 31o U.S. 650 (194o).
"6See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. loi (1915); cf. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,
261 U-S. 491 (1923).
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eral court should be able to mold its remedy independently. 10 9 How-
ever, it seems that the granting of prorata recovery is not based upon
remedial standards, that is, upon a determination of how best to carry
out the policy of the underlying liability-determining law Rather,
except in some liquidation situations, the desirability of prorata re-
covery depends upon prelitigation conduct. In other words, the de-
cision is not as to the desirability of one remedy or another in a given
factual situation,110 but rather a determination of whether to transfer
the substantive right to the recovery from the corporation to some of
its shareholders upon finding certain facts to exist."' Furthermore,
even if prorata recovery is considered merely one type of remedy
available to a court of equity, its unavailability in the state court may
be grounded upon a strongly felt state policy, 112 which should be
honored in the federal court.113 Moreover, the state legal rule regard-
ing prorata recovery directs the outcome of the litigation and should
therefore bind the federal court."
4
This same analysis should lead the federal court to attempt to
follow state law when the state decisions have refused prorata recov-
ery in some situations, but are silent concerning the situation before
the federal court. Conversely, if in a situation similar to that before
the federal court, a state court would grant prorata recovery, it seems
that the federal court should be obliged to do the same. This is not
a situation in which the federal court would merely close its doors to
the plaintiffs, remitting them to the state court." 5 Rather, the federal
court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore
"'See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 652 (1953).
The unavailability of any remedy in the state courts, however, closes the doors of
the federal courts sitting in the state in diversity cases. See Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
mSee Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 1o (1915).
"'See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (1956).
"'See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 9o4 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
"3Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958)
(some indication that in some areas the strength of the state policy may determine
whether the federal court must follow the state under Erie).
"'C. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). It is not clear what law
was followed in the Perlman case. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). In May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121
F.2d 431 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (i4i), in denying the equitable relief
requested and substituting a prorata recovery, the court did refer to the law of
the state of incorporation, but it is not clear that this law was determinative.
"'For indications that such door-closing may be permissible, see Hart & Wech-
sler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 658; Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 874, 964-65 (1958).
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should be required to follow the state rules regulating liability."16
However, if prorata recovery is urged in a liquidation situation solely
as a matter of convenience, the federal court should be free to mold
the remedy, provided no person shares in the recovery who would not
share if the suit were brought in the state court.11 7 When the courts
of the state have been completely silent, the federal court must at-
tempt to work out its results in accordance with whatever relevant
state law it can find.i' s
If the derivative suit could not have been brought in the state
court because of the inability to obtain service upon a nonresident
corporation, 1 9 it might be argued that the federal court should not
be limited by the state's rules concerning prorata recovery. This ar-
gument might prevail if this were a question of whether a particu-
lar type of multiparty litigation should be permitted in the federal
court when the device is unavailable in the state courts. 20 In this sit-
uation, however, the derivative suit device itself is available in the
state courts. Furthermore, since the issue of whether to grant pro
rata should be determined by state rules governing the underlying
liability, the inability to bring the action in the courts of the state
in which the federal court is sitting, solely because of service-of-process
problems, does not render the Erie doctrine inapplicable.121
A similar argument for federal independence in granting prorata
recovery might be made when the federal court obtains jurisdiction
of a state-created claim solely through the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction. 2 2 However, even though jurisdiction is not based upon diver-
"'Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U-.S 541 (1949) (rationale
that state security-for-costs statute creates a new liability).
"1 Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litigation, Pi Harv. L. Rev. 874, 996-98 (1958).
usSee generally Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 628-29.
1191f venue is laid in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958), extra-
territorial service over the corporation in whose behalf the suit is brought may
be obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958). See Developments-Multiparty Litiga-
tion, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 963 (1958).
"*See id. at 997-98. But cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (i941).
aIt is possible that the substantive law of a state other than that of the forum
should be applied, since venue may be laid under 28 U.S.C. § 14oi (1958) only
because the real defendants reside in the forum; the forum may have had no
connection with the alleged wrongful acts. It is arguable that in this situation the
federal court should ascertain the proper state law through an independent applica-
tion of conflict-of-law rules. Cf. Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 633-36.
However, Griffin v. McCoach, supra note i2o, may require the federal court to
apply the conflicts rule of the forum. If this is true, the federal court would be
obliged to apply the law of the forum state if that state regards the rules governing
prorata recovery as "procedural." Cf. Sampson v. Channell, 11o F.2d 751 (st Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (194o).
"mSee Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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sity of citizenship, Erie requires the application of state substantive
law in deciding the state-created right, for state law here operates in-
dependently and of its own force, and not merely through adoption
by federal law. '2 3 Therefore, the right of the federal court to make an
independent determination of the prorata issue, once the federal
claim has dropped out of the case leaving only the state claim for de-
cision, must be denied on the same reasoning as that applied in the
situation in which the suit could not have been brought in the state
court. However, if the federal claim is determined upon a trial, it
seems that federally developed rules on pro rata should govern even
though the state claim is incidentally adjudicated.
B. Federal Jurisdiction.
Since the derivative suit with prorata recovery should be con-
sidered sui generis, with some elements governed by the rules of the
ordinary derivative suit and others by the rules of ordinary non-
derivative class suits, 12 4 some question may arise as to the power of the
federal court sitting in a diversity-of-citizenship suit to permit non-
diverse shareholders to enter the suit to share in a prorata recovery. It
seems, though, that once the federal court has obtained jurisdiction
over the derivative suit, it should retain jurisdiction until the final re-
lief is granted. 125 However, since the granting of pro rata involves more
than the mere fashioning of a remedy, it might be argued that, for the
purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction, the entire suit must be gov-
erned by ordinary class-suit rules. Even so, diversity between the origin-
al parties of record should be sufficient even though non-diverse class
members enter later; this idea of minimal diversity will probably be
accepted.
26
More difficult is the question of jurisdictional amount-especially
"'See Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 697. If the plaintiff brings a de-
rivative suit based on a state-created cause of action, but can obtain federal-question
jurisdiction because he must rely on federal law in order to prove his case, see Smith
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 18o (1921), it still seems that the federal
court should be obliged to follow the state rule on pro rata, since the primary
duty involved in the case is determined by state law. When, however, the cause of
action is based upon federal law, the federal courts should be free to develop
their own rules governing prorata recovery.
"See text at notes 93-102, supra.
I . Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (bill ancillary
to earlier bill maintainable without diversity).
2"See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 933 (1958).
Professor Moore indicates that nondiverse members of a class can intervene in a
spurious class suit after the commencement of the action. 3 Moore, Federal Prac-
tice par. 23.1o, at 3443 (2d ed. 1948).
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in view of the recent increase in the requirement.127 While it is true
that a federal court does not lose jurisdiction of an action simply be-
cause the plaintiff fails to recover the jurisdictional anuant,1
28 it
might be argued that the decreeing of prorata recovery ..ianges the
suit into a new type of action for which an independent showing
of jurisdiction is required. 129 If this argument is sound, not only
might an aggregate prorata recovery in excess of $1oooo be required,
but possibly each claimant might be required to claim this amount.
In other words, solely for the purpose of deciding whether the mone-
tary requirement has been satisfied, the court may have to determine
whether the suit has become a "true," "hybrid," or "spurious" class
action under Federal Rule 23(a). Only if the suit is considered a
"true" class action could the various claims be aggregated.'3a It is
arguable that the shareholders comprising the plaintiff class share a
"common" right in the recovery within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(1)
relating to true class actions.' 3 ' However, when the defendants may
have personal defenses against some of the claimants and when the
total amount of the recovery will depend upon the number of share-
holders who qualify to share in the recovery the rights of the claim-
ants should be viewed as "several," thus rendering the suit "hybrid" or
"spurious"-probably the latter, although the matter of classification
is often extremely difficult. 3 2 Even so, in such class suits only the in-
dividual claims of the original parties of record need meet the
jurisdictional amount. 33 Thus small claimants would not be barred
from intervening, or participating without intervention, 34 although
there is some indication that in spurious class suits absentees can come
in only through intervention.
135
In order to avoid this tangle, the federal court should look only
to the amount claimed by the plaintiff in the complaint, subject to
'--28 U.SC. §§ 1331, 1332 (1958).
'See Hart and Wechsler, op cit. supra note iog, at 994-95-
L'See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 960 (1958).
' See id. at 933; Moore, Federal Practice par. 23A3, at 3477-78 (2d ed. 1948).
1
3
1Cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 57 (U.S.) 288 (1853) (suit concerning dis-
position of a pre-existing fund).
"See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 99, at 251-56.
mSee, e.g., Ames v. Mengel Co., 19o F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Moore, Federal
Practice par. 23.1o, at 3443 (2d ed. 1948).
"See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 712-13 (1941) (advocates participation after the decree, ap-
parently differing from formal intervention).
' See Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (1944) (by impli-
cation); Rahl, supra note 93, at 126, 130 (by implication). Such intervention must
probably be before the decree. See Chafee, op. cat. supra note 99, at 285.
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whatever criteria apply in other actions.136 Thus the possible corporate
recovery would be determinative. 137 However, when the plaintiff prop-
erly requests prorata recovery in the complaint, the actual prorata share
demanded should control. This approach seems justified, since the
whole purpose of the action is to dispose of the corporate cause of
action once and for all, whatever the kind of recovery ultimately
granted. The federal courts could use this sensible approach by
viewing the action as sui generis and not necessarily within any cate-
gory of Rule 23(a). Alternatively, if it is felt that, apart from specific
statutory authority,138 Rule 23 occupies the entire field of class-suit-
type actions in the federal courts, the same result can be reached by
relying on the categorization of the derivative suit as a true class suit
within Rule 23(a)(i). Thus, when the plaintiff properly requests
prorata recovery in his complaint, the court could treat the suit as a




The availability of prorata recovery may cast some light upon the
nature of the derivative suit, and even of the corporation itself. The
prorata remedy does not seem to fit in with any rigid concept of the
corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders, nor with a
corresponding conception of the derivative sUit.'
40 If the corporation
possesses a legal personality completely distinct from its shareholders,
logically it seems that the status of its shareholders, often the basis for
pro rata, should be irrelevant. The slight divergence from the rigid
entity approach introduced by the contemporaneous-ownership rule
in derivative suits does not appear to preclude the use of the entity
theory because the recovery is for the corporation. However, direct
'6See generally Hart & Wechsler, op. cit. supra note lo9, at 994-95.
-,See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 5i8, 523-24
(1947) (dictum).
"'E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 16 (b), 52 Stat. 1o69, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b); Rahl, supra note 93, at 132, 134 (class suit here a sm generis action).
'Cf. Kaufman v. Societe Internationale Pour Participatians Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA., 343 U.S. 156 (1952) (rationale that the corporation should
state a corporate claim on behalf of intervening nonenemy shareholders for the
proportion of the assets due to such intervenors). This case is discussed extensively
in Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum.
L. Rev. 8o8 (1955).
110See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ io89, iogi, io94, 1095 (5 th ed. 1941)
for a presentation of the entity theory of the corporation and derivative suit. The
pro rata problem is apparently ignored. Professor Stevens points out that the pro-
rata cases should lead to a "reassessment of the merit of the inherited concepts of
corporateness" Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 789 (2d ed. 1949).
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recovery by the shareholders through prorata recovery can result only
from a disregard of the corporate entity.141 The efore, rather than
attempting to justify the use of pro rata merely on he ground that
a court of equity should be able to mold this remedy because of the
necessity of an exceptional case,142 it would seem preferable to fit it in
with some general theory of the nature of the corporation and the
derivative suit. Thus the corporation should be considered an asso-
ciation of persons "united for a common purpose and permitted by
law to use a common name."' 43 The shareholders thus possess a dual
legal personality-individual and corporate. 4 4 The plaintiff share-
holder in a derivative suit acts in the latter capacity, the derivative
suit being a convenient procedural device designed to avoid a multi-
plicity of suits by shareholders and to insure that the rights of credi-
tors are safeguarded.145 Under this view of the corporation and the
derivative suit, prorata recovery may be used whenever a more equit-
able result can be reached by doing so, provided that the supervening
rights of creditors are protected.
This equitable device, though, should not be used too freely, since
a corporate recovery generally tends to insure that all the interests in
the corporation are protected.146 Furthermore, when the corporation
is a going concern, the management of the corporate funds should
generally remain in the hands of the corporate managers-the persons
appointed by the shareholders to manage their investment. 4T How-
ever, prorata recovery should be used to protect the investment of in-
nocent shareholders, as in the foreseeable-mismanagement situation,
and to bar shareholders against whom defendants clearly have equit-
able defenses.
If pro rata is so used, the objection that it tends to encourage
fraud 14 seems weak. If the defendants practice fraud or concealment
"'See Berger, supra note i39. See also Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 343 (947) (courts will disregard corporate entities to look to
the real enterprise in order to reach realistic results).
"'See May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941); Ballantine, Corporations § 143, at 336 (rev. ed. 1946).
'"Berle, supra note 141, at 352.
"'See Stevens, Private Corporations §§ 8, 9 (2d ed. 1949).
"'See Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847) (these practical reasons
urged as well as those based upon a strict view of the corporate entity).
'"In the liquidation situation, pro rata would afford the same protection. In
the sale-of-control situation especially, pro rata may be the only way to protect
the interests of a large group, the former shareholders.
'Cf. Glenn, The Stockholders' Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33
Yale L.J. 58o, 587-88 (1924).
"'Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253, 2 A.2d 904, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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in order to obtain the shareholder acquiescences relied upon for pro
rata a court of equity could hold that the acquiescences were inef-
fective because not all the facts were known, and thus award a cor-
porate recovery. 149 In the foreseeable-mismanagment situation, it
would be highly unrealistic to suppose that the defendants would feel
utterly free to mismanage in a grand manner, expecting the plaintiffs
to request pro rata in later litigation; there is always the risk that
a corporate recovery and a receiver might be demanded. In the sale-
of-control situation, it is true that the defendant sellers do keep part
of the unlawful "premium" when pro rata is decreed. Thus there is
force to the argument that there is some incentive to practice fraud
or concealment because of the availability of pro rata; perhaps the
suggestion that a full "prophylactic" corporate recovery should be had
against the sellers has some merit.1 0 However, the rights of former
shareholders must be protected, probably through some kind of direct
recovery. If prorata recovery is to be allowed solely because of the
presence of subsequent shareholders, the defendants may tend to
take risks, especially in a corporation with actively traded stock. How-
ever, it seems that they could not rely on the availability of pro rata,
since many factors might lead to a corporate recovery.15 1
On balance, prorata recovery, under certain circumstances, pro-
vides a useful and desirable method for redressing wrongs to the cor-
poration. Through it, the derivative suit is likely to become a far
more refined instrument for achieving corporate justice.
'"Cf. Holland v. Presley, 168 Misc. 942, 6 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1938), rev'd
on other grounds, 255 App. Div. 667, 8 N.YS.2d 804, affd mem., 28o N.Y. 835,
21 N.E.2d 884 (1939).
25°See Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 1o4 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 823-26
(1956).
IaSee text at notes 34-4o, supra.
